Legal Grounds for Suing IBB Over the June 12 Annulment

Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida’s recent admission on February 20, 2025, during the launch of his memoir A Journey in Service, that Moshood Kashimawo Olawale (MKO) Abiola won the June 12, 1993, election—and his subsequent expression of regret over its annulment—has reignited calls for accountability. Activists like Omoyele Sowore have long demanded prosecution, arguing that Babangida and his collaborators should face justice for derailing Nigeria’s democratic process. But what legal grounds could support a lawsuit against the former military president 32 years later? Below, we explore possible offenses under Nigerian law and the challenges they present.

Potential Offense Grounds

1. 1. Treason or Treasonable Felony
      • • Basis: Under Section 37 of the Criminal Code Act (applicable in Southern Nigeria) or Section 41 of the Penal Code (Northern Nigeria), treason involves acts to overthrow or undermine the government by unlawful means, while treasonable felony includes actions that impair the stability of the state. Babangida’s annulment of a free and fair election, which he now admits Abiola won, could be framed as an unconstitutional act that subverted the will of Nigerians and prolonged military rule.
      • • Details: The June 12 election was part of a transition to civilian rule mandated by Babangida’s own regime. By annulling it, he effectively disrupted the constitutional process, an act critics like Afenifere have labeled “treasonable.” His claim that the decision prevented a coup or civil war might be seen as a justification, not a defense, especially given his acknowledgment of Abiola’s victory.
      • • Evidence: Babangida’s memoir provides detailed election results (Abiola: 8,128,720 votes; Tofa: 5,848,247) and his admission of responsibility, strengthening the case that he knowingly thwarted a legitimate democratic outcome.
2. Abuse of Power or Official Misconduct

• • Basis: As military head of state, Babangida wielded decree-making powers, but these were not absolute. The annulment, executed via a hastily issued statement lacking official seals (as noted in his memoir), could be argued as an abuse of authority under customary legal principles or even international norms Nigeria was bound to uphold as a UN member.

• • Details: The National Electoral Commission (NEC) was dissolved, and Decree 13 of 1993 (prohibiting judicial review of electoral matters) was repealed post-annulment, suggesting an intent to suppress legal recourse. This could align with misconduct claims, especially since Babangida now admits the election was “credible, free, and fair.”

• • • • Evidence: Historical records of protests, NEC Chairman Humphrey Nwosu’s halted result announcements, and Babangida’s own narrative of being blindsided by Sani Abacha-led forces (yet accepting responsibility) could support allegations of reckless or deliberate misuse of power.

1. 1. Violation of Fundamental Rights
      • • Basis: Chapter IV of the 1979 Nigerian Constitution (in force until suspended later in 1993) guaranteed rights like political participation (Section 40). By annulling the election, Babangida arguably denied Nigerians their right to choose their leader, a breach actionable in civil suits by affected parties, such as Abiola’s family or voters.
      • • Details: Abiola’s subsequent arrest in 1994 after declaring himself president, his death in detention in 1998, and the repression of pro-democracy activists (e.g., over 100 deaths in July 1993 protests, per Human Rights Watch) could extend this to claims of consequential rights violations, including loss of life and liberty.
      • • Evidence: Testimonies from surviving activists, Abiola’s family (e.g., Hafsat Abiola-Costello’s recent statements), and documented crackdowns provide a basis, though linking these directly to Babangida’s initial act might require robust legal argumentation.

1. 1. Conspiracy
      • • Basis: Section 516 of the Criminal Code defines conspiracy as an agreement between two or more persons to commit an unlawful act. Babangida’s memoir hints at collaboration with figures like Sani Abacha, suggesting a collective effort to annul the election, which could constitute a conspiracy to undermine democracy.
      • • Details: Babangida claims Abacha’s forces acted without his full consent while he was in Katsina, yet he took “full responsibility.” This ambiguity could imply a coordinated plot involving military and civilian actors, as Sowore has alleged, naming Obasanjo, Abdulsalami, and David Mark as potential co-conspirators.
      • • Evidence: Lack of concrete proof of intent among co-conspirators (most deceased) weakens this, though Babangida’s own words and historical accounts of military dynamics might suffice for a prima facie case.

Legal and Practical Challenges

• • Statute of Limitations: Nigerian criminal law does not explicitly set a time limit for treason, a capital offense, but lesser crimes like abuse of power might be time-barred after 32 years. Civil claims (e.g., rights violations) typically face a six-year limit under the Limitation Act, barring exceptional circumstances.

• • Sovereign Immunity: As head of state, Babangida operated under military decrees granting immunity for official acts. Decree 13 of 1993 explicitly ousted judicial oversight of electoral matters, a shield that courts might still recognize unless deemed unconstitutional retroactively.

• • Jurisdiction and Evidence: No Nigerian court has jurisdiction over military-era acts unless reactivated by legislative fiat. Gathering admissible evidence—beyond Babangida’s admissions and historical records—poses a hurdle, especially with key figures like Abacha deceased.

• • Political Will: Successive governments, including Tinubu’s, have honored rather than prosecuted Babangida (e.g., his presence at the memoir launch). This suggests a lack of appetite for legal action, prioritizing reconciliation over retribution.

Could International Law Apply?

Some might argue for international forums like the International Criminal Court (ICC), but the ICC’s jurisdiction began in 2002, post-dating 1993. Crimes against humanity (e.g., post-annulment repression) require systematic attacks on civilians, a threshold the annulment’s fallout might not meet. Nigeria’s non-ratification of the Rome Statute until 2001 further complicates this route.

In Summary: A Symbolic, Not Practical, Pursuit

Suing Babangida could theoretically rest on treason, abuse of power, rights violations, or conspiracy—grounds bolstered by his own confession. Yet, legal barriers, from immunity to time limits, render prosecution improbable without a radical shift in Nigeria’s judicial or political landscape. For now, Babangida’s mea culpa may serve as moral accountability, but the courtroom remains a distant prospect. As Sowore insists, “it’s not too late to punish Babangida”—but history, not law, may be his final judge.