Negotiations don hit new wall over Israel strikes for Lebanon, and China and Russia dey set to play big role for who go outlast between US and Iran for long war.
Tehran don long dey invest for deeper cooperation with Beijing and Moscow. Although neither relationship be military alliance, di two powerful partners don maintain critical lifelines for economic, diplomatic and defense fronts despite Washington efforts to isolate di Islamic Republic.
Even as White House face im own growing pressure to end confrontation because of declining popular support, rising energy costs due to disruption for Strait of Hormuz, and sustainability of depleting munitions stockpiles, extended conflict go severely test di limits of Iran resilience and underline importance of im foreign partnerships.
Mehdi Kharratiyan, head of Institute for Revival of Politics think tank for Tehran, tell Newsweek say, ‘For Iran, growing perception don emerge say Trump primarily dey seek to buy time. For response to such strategy, Tehran would logically pursue unprecedented strengthening of im relations with Beijing and Moscow to address economic challenges and, if necessary, prepare for return to military confrontation.’
Even Trump don acknowledge say Iranian retaliation don surpass expectations, factor wey likely contribute to im decision to call for ceasefire on April 8. US pressure for Iranian ports don exacerbate Iran already precarious economic plight.
Kharratiyan say, ‘Di United States appears to assess say, due to maritime pressure and mounting economic challenges, Iran would capitulate before di United States for prolonged confrontation. At di same time, President Trump get little interest for allowing new war to spiral beyond control and leave am for politically unfavorable position on eve of World Cup and crucial midterm elections. He dey operate under pressure from Israeli lobby.’
He add say, ‘Under these circumstances, im most advantageous strategy na to keep Iran engaged through negotiations within parameters favorable to Washington while signaling to financial markets say di war likely go end soon. For practice, however, by prolonging di negotiations and maintaining state of ‘neither war nor peace,’ di United States fit deprive Tehran of both time and strategic initiative, ultimately increasing likelihood say Iran go accept Trump terms.’
Iranian media report Monday say Tehran team suspend talks due to Israel ongoing operations against Iran ally, Lebanese Hezbollah movement. Kharratiyan say, ‘Iran view issue of Lebanon—and preventing transformation of Shiite geopolitical position for Middle East—as existential and prestige-related matter. For all proposals and documents wey e present, Tehran don emphasize say di war must end on all fronts, including Lebanon.’
E add say, ‘E difficult to envision scenario where Iran and di United States reach ceasefire while Lebanon issue remain unresolved.’
Both US and Iran hard-line approaches constitute costly bets. Yet China and Russia appear ready to raise stakes for White House, even if neither power get interest for becoming directly involved for conflict.
Jon Alterman, former US State Department official wey now dey serve as chair for global security and geostrategy for Center for Strategic and International Studies, tell Newsweek say, ‘Russia, China and Iran all object to di United States being able to sanction any country e no like and then force di world to support those sanctions.’
Just how far China or Russia dey willing to go to support Iran still dey subject to debate. Iran and Russia conduct joint naval exercises with China for South Africa for January and for Persian Gulf region for February, just days leading up to war, though material aid don prove fleeting.
Iran, whose signature Shahed-style loitering munitions don emerge as key tool for Russia arsenal against Ukraine, don face persistent delays for receiving advanced Russian Su-35 jets wey e first agree to purchase years ago. Reports indicate say Iran don acquire some other Russian aircraft, like Yak-130 fighters and Mi-28 attack helicopters.
Di countries finalize long-awaited comprehensive strategic partnership agreement for January of last year, wey include bolstering military cooperation. Unlike similar deal forged months earlier between Russia and North Korea, e no involve any mutual defense clause. And while Tehran and Moscow don coordinate on battlefield before, namely during dia joint support for former Syrian government before im sudden downfall for December 2024, neither side dey expected to intervene directly on di other behalf.
China ink earlier strategic partnership deal with Iran for 2021. Di 25-year agreement focus primarily on sizable Chinese investment for economy and infrastructure of Iran, wey sell nearly all of im oil to China. US intelligence indicate say Beijing don supply Tehran with new anti-air platforms, including over-the-shoulder man-portable air defense systems, or MANPADS.
For economic front, Iran trade with both countries dey appear to grow, utilizing di landlocked Caspian Sea to Iran north and rail routes extending across Asia. Christopher Walker, vice president for Center for European Policy Analysis, tell Newsweek say, ‘Russia don reportedly dey supply Iran with intelligence on locations of American troops, ships, and aircraft. Since Israeli strikes against Iran begin for February of this year, Russia don continue delivering weapons components and technical expertise.’
Iran don formalize im drift to China and Russia by joining two blocs led by di powers, di Shanghai Cooperation Organization for 2023 and di BRICS group for 2024. Walker say dis development show say ‘Tehran don essentially throw im lot with Beijing and Moscow for challenge against di West.’
Alterman say, ‘China and Russia dey more important to Iran than vice-versa. China, for example, na Iran largest oil customer and represent more than one-third of Iran overall trade. Iran, by contrast, represent less than 1 percent of China overall trade. Each see Iran presenting opportunities, especially weakening di United States as global power.’
E add say, ‘Each use Iran, but neither one really ‘need’ Iran. Iran dey much more reliant on dem for external support. Saudi Arabia export more oil to China than Iran do, and UAE na important base for many wealthy Russians. But di important thing to keep for mind na say China and Russia no really believe for allies. Dem dey transactional. Dat mean dia goal na to balance support for Iran with not antagonizing Gulf Arab partners and not helping Iran so much say e create major problems with di United States.’
From Iran perspective, limits to alignment dey rooted for historic skepticism toward reliance on foreign powers. Post-revolutionary Iran fight im last major war largely alone, while majority of international support go to Iraq throughout di eight-year bloody conflict for di 1980s—situation wey help fuel Tehran strategy of investing for im own coalition of ideologically aligned actors.
More recent experiences don reinforce dis aversion to formal security pacts, according to Arash Reisinezhad, visiting assistant professor for Tufts University Fletcher School. E tell Newsweek say, ‘During di recent wars, di Twelve-Days War and di Iran War, both countries offer political support and diplomatic backing, but neither provide di kind of decisive and unconditional support associated with military alliances. Dis no be necessarily because either country dey hostile to Iran. Rather, dia own national interests discourage transforming dia relationships with Tehran into formal alliance commitments.’
E say, ‘As result, widespread perception dey among Iranian policymakers say, for moments of existential crisis, neither Moscow nor Beijing fit ultimately be relied upon as guarantors of Iranian security. Dis perception don historically shape Iranian strategic thinking and help explain why Tehran continue to place greater emphasis on self-reliance and indigenous deterrence capabilities than on external security guarantees.’
Yet, e argue say ‘di debate inside Iran dey appear to evolve,’ with growing chorus of voices calling for closer security coordination with China, for particular. And while Beijing fit no dey willing or able to match Washington status for Middle East, nor Moscow capable of eschewing Ukraine war commitments to substantially increase military aid to Tehran, ways dey for di trio to optimize coordination.
Reisinezhad say, ‘Where China and Russia fit become more important no be through alliance formation but through accelerating Eurasian connectivity. Future cooperation likely go focus on trade routes, logistics networks and continental corridors linking East Asia, Central Asia, Russia, and di Middle East.’ Such cooperation also serve core Chinese and Russian interests extending across di heart of Asia and beyond.
E say, ‘Despite years of sanctions, underinvestment, and policy mismanagement wey don limit Iran ability to fully capitalize on regional connectivity projects, Iran retain unique geoeconomic position. E be di only country capable of providing China with direct overland access to di hydrocarbon-rich Persian Gulf region. For Beijing, Iran represent both east-west economic bridge and gateway connecting Central Asia to West Asia and di Middle East.’
E add say, ‘For Russia, meanwhile, Iran serve broader geopolitical function. From Moscow perspective, Iran constitute important component of di southern Eurasian rimland. Severe weakening or collapse of di Islamic Republic fit generate greater strategic pressure along Russia southern flank while simultaneously increasing pressure on China western periphery. Dis no mean say either power go fight on Iran behalf. E do, however, help explain why both Moscow and Beijing get strong incentives to preserve stability for Iran and maintain cooperative relations with Tehran.’
