Di International Criminal Court, wey dem dey call ICC, don voice out say di decision of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger to withdraw from di court dey undermine di global pursuit of justice. Di three West Africa countries, wey military dey lead, announce last year say dem dey pull out from ICC, wey dey prosecute individuals for war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Dem tok say di court, wey dey The Hague, na “instrument of neo-colonialist repression in di hands of imperialism.” Di ICC Assembly of State Parties, wey represent all di countries wey be members, say dem “take note of di situation with concern” and regret di withdrawals. Countries wey dey leave ICC “risk undermining di collective pursuit of justice and weakening global efforts to end impunity,” di statement tok.
Currently, 125 countries be members of ICC, but some major powers like China, India, Israel, Russia, and United States never join. Niger formal request to withdraw dis month make people begin ask wetin go happen to victims of atrocities for Niger and across ICC member states when governments abandon di world court of last resort.
Niger withdrawal go take effect one year after notification under Article 127 of di Rome Statute. Dis go make Niger di third country for di world—after Burundi and Philippines—to complete di process of leaving ICC. Niger currently dey under military rule following di July 2023 coup, and now join Mali and Burkina Faso, wey be fellow members of di Alliance of Sahel States, all under military rule and all facing allegations of serious human rights abuses.
Mali and Burkina Faso also announce intention to withdraw from ICC, though dem never submit formal requests yet. Nearly every state wey don withdraw or announce plans to withdraw from ICC do so during periods of democratic decline, authoritarian consolidation, or widespread allegations of human rights violations. For such contexts, withdrawal risk becoming not merely a legal decision but a political shield against external scrutiny.
Di consequences of withdrawal no dey borne by governments or political elites, wey often seek to insulate demselves from scrutiny. Dem fall instead on ordinary victims, whose prospects for justice become increasingly limited when domestic institutions fail and ICC no longer available as court of last resort. For victims, ICC na more than a court—na often di only institutional recognition say dia suffering matter.
For northern Uganda, survivors of Lord’s Resistance Army see Dominic Ongwen convicted for atrocities committed as both victim and perpetrator. Di court also order am to pay about $56 million in reparations to di victims. For Timbuktu, communities devastated by destruction of cultural heritage witness Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi held accountable and ordered to provide reparations of about $3 million. For Democratic Republic of Congo, victims of armed conflict participate directly in proceedings wey acknowledge dia harm.
Through Article 75 and di Trust Fund for Victims, ICC don also facilitate reparations, rehabilitation, and support services for survivors of atrocity crimes. When states withdraw, dem no simply reduce institutional reach—dem risk weakening one of di few global mechanisms wey recognize victims as central participants in justice.
When states walk away from ICC, e no be political leaders or military commanders wey bear di greatest cost. E be victims: di mother wey lose her children for massacre; di survivor of sexual violence for conflict; di child forced into armed groups; and communities displaced for decades without redress. History offer consistent warning: when accountability mechanisms weaken, impunity expand; when impunity expand, violence dey more likely to recur.
Di measure of any justice system no be its ability to protect di powerful, but its capacity to serve di powerless. For many victims across Africa and beyond, ICC remain—imperfect, contested, and evolving—one of di few institutions wey dey attempt to ensure say di gravest crimes no go unanswered. ICC was established by di Rome Statute for 2002 and dey prosecute individuals—not states—for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression.
Its jurisdiction dey guided by di principle of complementarity under Article 17, meaning di Court fit intervene only when national systems no able or willing to genuinely investigate or prosecute these crimes. For victims, ICC often represent di final available avenue for accountability when domestic justice systems fail or dey compromised.
ICC dey frequently misunderstood as politically driven institution, but its procedures dey legally structured and multilayered. Every situation begin with preliminary examination under Article 15, where di Prosecutor assess whether there be reasonable basis to proceed. If satisfied, di Prosecutor fit open investigation, subject to judicial oversight. Arrest warrants or summonses must then be authorized by di Pre‑Trial Chamber, ensuring judicial control over prosecutorial discretion. Only after charges dey confirmed does case proceed to trial before full chamber of judges.
Dis framework dey designed to guarantee say prosecutions dey evidence‑based rather than politically motivated. Di Court jurisprudence reflect dis standard. For example, former Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo and former Youth Minister Charles Blé Goudé were acquitted for January 2019 after judges find say di prosecution evidence no meet di required burden of proof—decisions later upheld on appeal for March 2021. These outcomes underscore say ICC na court of law, not conviction mechanism, and say its legitimacy rest on adherence to due process and evidentiary rigor.
Joining ICC require state to sign and ratify di Rome Statute and deposit its instrument of ratification with United Nations Secretary‑General. Dis process signal commitment to international criminal justice and bind di state to cooperate with di Court jurisdiction over di gravest crimes. Withdrawal, by contrast, dey governed by Article 127(1), wey allow State Party to leave di Court through written notification, taking effect one year later.
Importantly, Article 127(2) stipulate say withdrawal no affect obligations already incurred, nor e halt ongoing investigations or proceedings related to crimes committed while di state still be member. While withdrawal fit shield governments from future scrutiny, e no fit erase accountability for past crimes. However, once state withdraw, future victims fit lose access to ICC if domestic institutions fail to deliver justice.
Critics often argue say ICC disproportionately target Africa. Di record, however, dey more nuanced. Several African situations were referred to di Court by di states demselves under Article 14, including Uganda (2004); Mali (2012); Democratic Republic of Congo (2004); Central African Republic (2004 and 2014), and Côte d'Ivoire (2015). Other situations, such as Darfur and Libya, were referred by UN Security Council under Article 13(b), for 2005 and 2011 respectively with African states participating in di vote or abstaining rather than opposing.
Di Kenya situation—where both President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto were indicted by ICC—was initiated by di Prosecutor proprio motu following preliminary examination of post‑election violence. Gabon also request preliminary examination for 2016. These facts complicate di narrative of external imposition. Dem show say African states no be passive targets but active participants for ICC processes.
However, dem no fully resolve legitimate concerns raised by African institutions, particularly di African Union, regarding unequal global power dynamics, and di influence of UN Security Council referral and deferral powers. Fair assessment must therefore hold both truths: African states don actively engage ICC, while structural and political factors continue to shape perceptions of imbalance.
Di ICC reach extend well beyond Africa. For example, Philippines formally withdraw for 2019, yet under Article 127(2) di Court retain jurisdiction over crimes committed while di country still be member. Dis provision don enable investigations into alleged abuses during di “war on drugs” campaign. Proceedings against former President Rodrigo Duterte don advance through judicial review, with his trial currently scheduled to begin on November 30, 2026.
Burundi withdrawal for 2017 further illustrate di limits of exit. ICC open investigation during di withdrawal period, demonstrating say timing dey critical: withdrawal no fit shield individuals from accountability for crimes already under examination. These cases show say withdrawal narrow, but no erase, di reach of international justice. Dem also underscore say di consequences of retreat dey borne by victims, wey fit lose access to future accountability mechanisms even as past crimes remain subject to scrutiny.
E often dey argued say powerful states such as United States, Russia, China, and India dey effectively insulated from ICC scrutiny because dem never ratify di Rome Statute. Dis claim dey only partly accurate. Under Article 12(2)(a), ICC fit exercise jurisdiction when alleged crimes occur on di territory of State Party, even if di accused be national of non‑member state. In addition, Article 13(b) allow UN Security Council to refer situations regardless of nationality.
Di more significant constraint no be legal design but political reality—particularly di veto power of permanent members of Security Council, wey fit block referrals or deferrals and limit enforcement. Dis imbalance highlight di uneven global landscape of international justice: while weaker states remain vulnerable to scrutiny, powerful states fit often avoid accountability through political influence rather than legal immunity.
Di African critique of ICC no without foundation. Concerns include perceived selectivity in case selection, dependence on Security Council referrals, and di disproportionate focus on African situations during di Court early years. These criticisms don dey voiced consistently by African governments and institutions, particularly di African Union, wey argue say di Court operations reflect broader inequalities in di international system.
At di same time, ICC don expand its reach beyond Africa. Investigations for Ukraine, Georgia, Afghanistan, and Palestine demonstrate say di Court mandate no confine to one region. E don also deliver landmark convictions and develop victim participation framework wey remain unique in international criminal law, ensuring say survivors no be merely witnesses but active participants in di pursuit of justice.
Di debate, therefore, no be choice between African sovereignty and international justice, nor between defending and dismantling ICC. Di real challenge na how to reform di Court so e become more universal, more equitable, and more effective in delivering accountability. Reform proposals—many advanced by African legal and political institutions—focus on improving geographic balance, reducing political influence in referrals, strengthening cooperation and enforcement mechanisms, and ensuring more consistent application of international justice.
Constructive path forward dey lie in reform rather than retreat. Africa, having both engaged di Court and borne di brunt of criticisms against am, dey uniquely positioned to lead dis conversation. By advocating reforms wey address legitimate concerns while preserving di Court victim-centered mandate, African states fit help shape stronger and fairer system of international justice.
