E get one big wahala for Royal Navy o. All dia attack submarines wey get nuclear power, every single one, dey for harbor or for dock. No single one dey for sea. Dis one na serious matter, e no be first time, and last time e happen, Ministry of Defence just talk say ‘we dey meet all our tasks.’ But we no dey meet dem.
Navy Lookout website don break am down boat by boat. HMS Audacious just dey come out from dry dock for Devonport for Plymouth. HMS Anson, di only attack boat wey don go sea recently, dey alongside after dem cut short dia trip to Australia. HMS Astute dey for multi-year refit. Ambush and Artful no don sail for years. Di site call di overall posture ‘a disaster.’
For short term, e get little wey we fit do. Dis na di payoff from decades of decline, and e no fit reverse quick-quick. Some dey talk say make we buy conventional submarines, but e no go easy, quick, or cheap. And conventional boat almost no be submarine at all compared to nuclear one.
Di existing programmes wey supposed to fix matter – submarine maintenance recovery plan, and dock and infrastructure rebuilds for Faslane for Scotland under Project Euston, and for Devonport – need to push with urgency and, where possible, accelerate. Di scale of dis wahala dey like say we dey tell Sisyphus to stop loafing and put im back into am.
Beyond dat, di priorities clear: return more existing boats to sea, build resilience for Faslane, expand industrial capacity for next generation, and protect Aukus – di security partnership between Australia, UK, and US – and di continuous deterrent. For long term, Aukus na di answer.
Di more important question na wetin dis mean for right now. Consider geography. Di Bear Gap – di stretch of water between North Cape of Norway and southern tip of Svalbard, about 400 miles across – na di front door to Norwegian Sea. About 1,000 miles to di south-west dey di GIUK gap, between Greenland, Iceland, and UK (specifically Scotland) wey form di back door. If you pass through undetected, you dey for North Atlantic, wey be 30 times di area and include most of our critical undersea infrastructure.
Di role of Royal Navy historically, alongside Norway, United States, and others, na to contain Russian submarine fleet behind di front door, or at least maintain enough presence to detect am passing. Dey get several ways to hold dat line, but di SSN (ship submersible nuclear) remain di most effective and di most feared. Di fear factor important when we dey deter somebody wey only understand strength.
When be di last time we send boat up dere? Such patrols dem once routine for submariners; now dem exceptional, and a generation of hard-won experience don lost. Stories of wetin boats do up dere during Cold War na legend, and di men wey operate di subs too. Importantly, by di time a submarine captain go up dere for command, im don already complete dozens of such patrols as junior officer.
When we dey try to track enemy boats, dey many things to consider. Conducting anti-submarine operations for Arctic operational theatre require working understanding of water columns and oceanography, wey require regular presence, as well as familiarity with acoustic signatures of di boats dem dey track. We don accumulate working knowledge of Russian Akula class SSN, but when be di last time we trail di newer and quieter Yasen-class? And whisper dis: how long before one of dem trail one of ours?
Di same picture look different from Russian side. To Moscow, dose doors open di other way, and ‘di bastion’ as dem call am na something to defend, not penetrate. Russians no get wish to see Western submarines operating up north, because dat na where dia own ballistic-missile boats routinely operate. Again, previous patrols see us not just up dere, but right into Barents Sea lurking outside dia main bases. Most of di detail remain locked away.
Beyond experience for High North and ability to contain threat dere, a good deal else dey lost as di boats remain alongside. Di SSN na important means of deterring interference with undersea cables and pipelines. E be our primary land-strike platform and di only thing we get wey fit launch Tomahawk. E be our primary anti-ship platform by distance. E contribute to protecting di deterrent at sea, wey less directly connected dan sometimes claim, but still real. Di SSN allow di carrier group to remain undetected.
Those wey think drones or missiles or something don render carrier obsolete, dem often fail to grasp just how much more dangerous an enemy SSN be for dis regard. For an era where we don become politically afraid to deploy our carriers, we no make am easy by forcing naval officers to say ‘actually, if we no get SSN for company, den we no go.’ Even today, Royal Fleet Auxiliary Lyme Bay dey approach Strait of Hormuz and really suppose get SSN nearby.
And finally, nuclear subs provide covert capabilities: intelligence-gathering and special-forces support, rarely used but valuable when required. Dose na di operational effects. Beneath dem, other things dey eroded. Safety suffer as crews lose currency. Training dey increasingly run on borrowed foreign boats. Dis one worry me plenty as dese things fit erode so slowly, nobody even know e dey happen. Morale decline as experienced and ambitious personnel sit alongside wit little to do. Or conversely, end up doing family-breaking long patrols because only one boat dey available. All di while credibility dey affected, wit allies wey notice di absence of presence.
None of dis easy to measure, and all of am go take years to rebuild. I bin for one wargame recently where, as Britain under Russian attack, dem give me two working SSNs. I use both of dem for di first turn of di game – one to shadow and eventually engage a Russian group of surface warships, di other to go round di top and provide strike options. Wit both so allocated, we no fit use di carrier because we no fit protect am against di unlocated enemy SSNs. And dat one be wit two, wey feel like luxury. Today’s figures bear dat out.
I don always argue say if you delete every capability Royal Navy get, from bottom to top, di last two wey go stand na frigates and submarines. Without di former, you no get navy. Without di latter, you lose di ability to deter through fear. We dey at least build frigates: too slowly and no for sufficient numbers, but we dey build dem. Di position wit our submarines worse. Di maintenance recovery plan dey under way, but progress dey painful. Money don dey allocated, perhaps proving say e no fit fix everything, but e sure help and more dey needed – along wit new way of managing vast and expensive defence projects more generally.
Atlantic Bastion, di plan to dominate up to and including Bear Gap using uncrewed systems, na complex and commendable addition. But e must remain addition, not replacement. Undersea autonomy likely to be di last warfare area where crewed systems go be operationally surpassed, if e happen at all. Besides, if you fit develop AI wey fit think like submariner, you probably shut am down for short order.
Meanwhile, without allies, di Bear Gap – di front door – remain open. Di GIUK back door fit cover at stretch, by single frigate and whichever of di nine P-8 aircraft dey serviceable. Dat return di problem to our allies, wit whom we don stop being lead and someone to look up to, and don become burden. As much pain as dat cause me to say, dat na where we dey wit submarines. All di while, we as country, and our SSNs, dey become less safe every day. Di rest of di once mighty Royal Navy no far behind. And still di Government no accept di case for proper increase for defence spending.
A defence minister don say massive investment dey needed to improve di infrastructure at di home of Royal Navy’s nuclear deterrent. Defence Readiness and Industry Minister Luke Pollard don promise funding to develop facilities at HMNB Clyde for Scotland go include for upcoming Defence Investment Plan, known as DIP. Speaking to Westminster’s Scottish Affairs Committee, Mr Pollard tell MPs say lack of spending by previous governments don leave di base for Clyde need major investment.
‘I think if you look at di defence nuclear enterprise more broadly and di activities within di nuclear ring fence, wey go include, for instance, some of di submarine activity wey Royal Navy undertake, we no don see di investment for quite some time,’ im talk. ‘For fact, der be deliberate decisions made by di previous administration to move some of dat investment to di right to manage some of di austerity policies dem get at dat time. Dat don leave real backlog at Faslane and, having visited Faslane number of times, I think e fair to say say some of di facilities der, not just for di submarines but for di people, need massive investment.’
‘Wetin we go set out na di high-level spending lines for some of di nuclear transformation,’ im add. ‘Now, dat be both for Clyde, where we go announce wetin kind high-level investments for der, because e part of di nuclear enterprise, we no go go into di line-item details. We need good facilities to dock di submarines, we need good facilities to maintain di submarines, and we need good facilities for our people wey work der. I think at di moment e fair to say say wetin we inherit no deliver all three of dose. Di plan go get after dat, just as e get after di necessity to get more deep refit facilities for Devonport for di constituency I represent, for instance,’ im continue. ‘Dat again something wey dem push to di right and I think one of di bits of inheritance wey we dey try to get after for di DIP.’
Di Faslane base dey home to Royal Navy’s four Vanguard-class ballistic missile submarines as well as Astute-class hunter killer boats and employ more dan 6,500 people. Mr Pollard hope availability of di vessels go improve by funding wey include for Defence Investment Plan. ‘Di threat dey rising – we need greater availability of our platforms,’ im tell MPs. ‘One of di reasons we no get di availability wey I think we all like no be because of di platform itself, no be because of di people, but because of di infrastructure wey no don invest. I fit see why previous governments make di decision to delay wetin for paper look very expensive, unsexy projects. Di problem na, dem absolutely vital for di ability for us to deploy dose assets and dat why you suppose expect to see investment for Faslane for particular for di DIP.’ Di minister reiterate di promise say di DIP go publish by di Nato summit for Ankara for 7 July.
